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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 When the 1989 revisions of the New York City Charter were adopted by the 
voters nearly twenty-five years ago, the New York Times called these revisions “the 
most thorough overhaul” of our city government since the city itself was created a 
century earlier.1 This symposium, Process, Powers and Lessons for the Future: 25 Years 
of New York City Charter Revisions,2 poses a fundamental question: Does the revised 
Charter work, and to what extent, if any, should it be changed?
 To answer this question, I will draw upon my more than eleven years of experience 
as Corporation Counsel of New York City and head of the city’s Law Department—a 
position, incidentally, that I truly believe to be the best legal job in America. Pursuant 
to the Charter, the Law Department represents and advises the Mayor, City 
Commissioners, the City Council, the Comptroller, and other institutional bodies,3 a 
role that every day requires us to interpret the Charter and deal with its allocation of 
powers—subject, of course, to judicial review. This Charter-mandated role of the Law 
Department, together with the counsel provided to Charter Revision Commissions 
by many present and former Assistant Corporation Counsels (including New York 
Law School Dean and President Anthony W. Crowell), gives us a unique perspective 
on how the Charter has worked in practice over the last twenty-five years.
 In the last decade, the Bloomberg administration has achieved a number of 
successes, and has encountered occasional failures, in its efforts to make New York 
City a better place to live and work. The successes have not been easy. As we can see 
in Albany, and particularly in Washington, it can be difficult for government to get 
anything done these days. We need to give credit where it is due: first, to the people 
who make things happen, day in and day out, through their creativity, hard work, 
and leadership; and second, to the political framework that allows talented individuals 
to accomplish their goals. Of course, this framework includes the processes and 
institutions put in place or further refined by the 1988 and 1989 Charter Revision 
Commissions.
 It is my view that the 1989 Charter, and by that I refer to the ultimate document 
as amended by the 1988 and 1989 Charter Revision Commissions, works well to 
meet the needs of our ever growing, changing, and increasingly diverse city. This is a 
tribute to the judgment and foresight of the members and staff of those Commissions, 
as well as to Mayor Edward I. Koch, who appointed the Commissions’ members.
 As Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., one of my distinguished predecessors and Chair 
of the 1989 Charter Revision Commission, wrote after the voters approved the 1989 
revisions, “The new Charter is not a perfect document; no Charter can be . . . [but] 
1. Alan Finder, The 1989 Elections: Overhaul of New York City Charter is Approved, Polls Show, N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 8, 1989, http://www.nytimes.com/1989/11/08/nyregion/1989-elections-charter-overhaul-new-
york-city-charter-approved-polls-show.html.
2. Symposium, Process, Powers and Lessons for the Future: 25 Years of New York City Charter Revisions, 58 
N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 11 (2013–2014). A video of this symposium, held at New York Law School on 
February 8, 2013, is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OHkcyaagQ4A.
3. N.Y.C. Charter § 394(a) (2013).
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it does lay a foundation for City government that will be responsive to all our needs, 
represent us better, and give us greater opportunities to influence the decisions that 
affect our lives.”4 I believe that the 1989 Charter “works” because it provides: first, a 
workable structure for government to get things done; second, a process that allows 
things to get done that is also transparent, provides for participation and dissent, 
holds its players accountable, and legitimizes its outcomes; and third, a system that 
protects the public’s trust by ensuring that the elected and appointed individuals who 
make up the government are properly selected and held to a high level of integrity.
 This balancing act—between results on the one hand, and process and trust on 
the other—can also be seen in the Charter revision process itself. Unlike federal or 
state constitutions, our City’s governing instrument is not a static document, but one 
that can be—and has been—amended in a number of different ways: by local law 
enacted by the city Council,5 by appointment of a Charter Revision Commission,6 by 
voter petition,7 or by state legislation.8 This f lexibility allows the Charter to be a 
living document, responsive to the challenges of the day and to the desires of a wide 
universe of stakeholders.
 Although there is much more to be said about the way the city may amend its 
Charter, this article will be limited to the substance of the 1989 Charter and the 
amendments that have been made since then. In my view, the 1989 Charter works 
because it continues to provide for the central role of the Mayor while providing for 
appropriate checks and balances, by the Council in particular, but also by the courts, 
the Comptroller, and other officials.9
 I will illustrate this balancing of powers by discussing three significant areas of 
policymaking for the city: land use, procurement, and the budget—areas that Mr. 
Schwarz and Eric Lane, counsel to the 1989 Commission, identified when they 
ref lected on the 1989 Charter a decade later in their seminal article.10 In each of 
these areas the 1989 Commission put into place a framework that allows things to 
get done, together with strong institutional checks on a traditionally mayor-
dominated system. I will also discuss the ways in which the 1989 Charter improved 
upon processes to help ensure the integrity of these political players. Finally, I will 
4. Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr. & Eric Lane, The Policy and Politics of Charter Making: The Story of New 
York City’s 1989 Charter, 42 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 723, 1012–13 (1998); see also Frederick A.O. Schwarz, 
Jr., Twenty-Five Years Later: Reflections on New York City’s 1989 Charter Revision Commission, and on 
Charter Commissions in General, 58 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 95 (2013–2014).
5. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law §§ 20, 21 (McKinney 2013); see also N.Y.C. Charter §§ 33–37 (2013). 
A referendum is required or authorized for certain local laws enacted by the Council. N.Y. Mun. Home 
Rule Law §§ 23, 24; N.Y.C. Charter § 38.
6. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 36.
7. N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 37; see also N.Y.C. Charter § 40(2).
8. N.Y. Const. art. IX, § 2.
9. For further discussion of using citywide officers as a check on the Mayor, see infra Part III. 
10. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4.
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brief ly address a few areas of the Charter that might be re-examined as we look 
ahead to future Charter revisions.
ii. hOW thE ChartEr “WOrKs”
 The journey we look back upon starts with Board of Estimate v. Morris, in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Board of Estimate’s composition was an 
unconstitutional violation of the principle of “one person, one vote,” thereby 
necessitating a rewriting of the city’s constitution.11 The major challenge facing the 
1988 and 1989 Commissions was whether to retain the Board of Estimate in some 
form; and, if not, how to reallocate the Board of Estimate’s substantial executive and 
legislative powers. The 1989 Commission decided to abolish the Board of Estimate 
and reallocate its powers mostly to the Mayor and the City Council12—a fundamental 
decision that, in large part, still governs the city today.
 A. Land Use
 The first area in which we see the Charter working for the city is in land use 
decisions, many of which lie at the heart of the tension between the need both for 
outcomes and process, and for centralized strategic planning together with 
community input. In the area of land use, the 1989 Commission made significant 
changes to a process that dated back to the 1975 Charter revisions and, in some 
areas, decades earlier. The Commission eliminated the central role previously played 
by the Board of Estimate, and placed the Council in the Board of Estimate’s role of 
giving the final up or down vote on many land use decisions.13 The new Charter also 
formalized or retained participation by Community Boards, the Borough Presidents, 
and Borough Boards.14 Most importantly, the 1989 Charter amended the process 
known as the Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), retaining the concept 
of, and providing for, specific time frames to govern the entire land use process from 
beginning to end.15
 Despite the fears of many that this arrangement would lead to land use paralysis—
the parochial concerns of individual Council Members being thought to potentially 
outweigh rational planning—the process has worked well. Over the last eleven years, 
the city government, advised by the Law Department, has spurred economic 
development through a number of projects, including the High Line, whose 
popularity among locals and tourists has exceeded all wildest expectations; Hudson 
11. See Bd. of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688, 690–92 (1989).
12. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 853–56 (discussing how the 1989 Commission reached this 
decision).
13. N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Final Report of the New York City Charter Revision 
Commission: January 1989–November 1989, at 19–20 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Charter Revision 
Comm’n Report].
14. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Charter § 197(a) (1989).
15. See id.
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Yards, the rezoning of which will allow for the expansion of both the High Line and 
the Number 7 subway into Midtown West; and the redevelopment of the Greenpoint 
and Williamsburg waterfronts. Each of these projects, and scores of others, have 
revitalized communities, generated jobs and private investment, attracted businesses 
and residents to new neighborhoods, and created public spaces for all.
 We even see the Charter working when projects are not realized, such as Mayor 
Bloomberg’s proposal to redevelop Kingsbridge Armory as a retail mall.16 Here, the 
opponents of the project persuaded the Council not to approve it, a decision we 
believe to have been incorrect. But this example illustrates the Charter’s checks-and-
balances system in operation, and demonstrates that the mandated land use time 
frames in the Charter have allowed policymakers, following the timely objection to 
the initial proposal, to expeditiously move on to new ideas for the site.17
 The bottom line is that the 1989 Charter put into place a process through which 
the Mayor has been able to obtain approval for a number of key revitalization projects, 
while allowing for appropriate checks on his initiatives by the community and the 
Council, all within the mandated time frames that require land use decisions to be 
made one way or the other, instead of being allowed to languish.
 B. Procurement
 We can also see the 1989 Charter working when it comes to procurement, the 
day-to-day, but essential process through which the city makes its purchases, which 
last year totaled almost $15 billion in over 55,000 separate transactions.18
 The 1989 Commission faced a procurement system that a state commission had 
labeled “highly fragmented, complex and opaque,” chaotic, and—at times—corrupt.19 
Under the previous system, the Board of Estimate voted on contracts not competitively 
bid on, leading to a lack of accountability. If something went wrong, each Board of 
Estimate member could disclaim individual responsibility and instead point a finger 
at the others.20
 In response, the 1989 Commission made the executive branch primarily 
responsible for procurement.21 One person—the Mayor—was made ultimately 
accountable for most of the city’s procurement decisions, subject to checks like the 
16. See Sam Dolnick, Council Overrides Veto, Blocking Plan for Armory Mall, N.Y. Times, Dec. 21, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/22/nyregion/22armory.html.
17. Mayor Bloomberg has since announced plans to develop the Armory into the world’s largest indoor ice 
skating center. See Jennifer H. Cunningham, Kingsbridge Armory Ice Rink Plan Caps Years of Contentious 
Debate on Site’s Future, Brings Mayor and Boro Prez Together, N.Y. Daily News, Apr. 25, 2013, http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/kingsbridge-armory-house-world-largest-ice-skating-center-
article-1.1326481.
18. About Procurement, N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Contract Servs., http://www.nyc.gov/html/mocs/
html/procurement/procurement.shtml (last visited July 22, 2013).
19. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 880–81.
20. Id. at 882.
21. 1989 Charter Revision Comm’n Report, supra note 13, at 25.
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Procurement Policy Board, which develops comprehensive rules for all contracts,22 
and the Comptroller, who can decline to register a contract on certain limited 
grounds.23 Although the system has not worked perfectly, having these clear lines of 
accountability has made it easier to pinpoint responsibility, and to enable the city to 
learn from its past experiences and take steps to reform the procurement process 
where necessary.
 Two cases litigated during my tenure illustrate the checks and balances provided 
for in the 1989 Charter with respect to procurement. In Council of New York v. 
Bloomberg, the New York Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, rejected the 
Council’s contention that every law it passed, no matter how legally suspect, had to 
be enforced by the Mayor.24 Instead the court ruled that if the Mayor in good faith 
believes that a law passed by the Council is invalid, he need not enforce it absent a 
contrary judicial determination.25
 In Comptroller of New York v. Mayor of New York, the New York Court of Appeals 
made clear that the Comptroller’s authority under the Charter to register contracts 
was not unlimited and did not give him the power to refuse to register a contract 
because he found, despite the Mayor’s and the Law Department’s contrary 
certifications, that the legal requirements for registering the contract had not been 
met.26 At the same time, however, the court rejected the Mayor’s contention and 
ruled that disposition of the city’s intellectual property is subject to the Charter’s 
concession review procedures.27 Notably, in support of its conclusions, the court cited 
the underlying goals of the 1989 Charter revision efforts: “to ensure transparency in 
the governmental process, and adequate checks and balances.”28
 These cases, in addition to highlighting the powers of the Comptroller, illustrate 
the role the courts play in refereeing the various balance-of-power struggles under 
the 1989 Charter. In this way we can think of the judiciary as still another institutional 
check on the power of the Mayor.
 C. Budget
 A third area in which the 1989 Charter and its subsequent amendments have set 
up a workable framework is the city’s budget process, which is inherently political 
because by its very nature it helps define the city’s values, priorities, and choices. The 
1989 Commission replaced bicameral approval of the budget by the Board of Estimate 
and Council, with unicameral approval by the Council alone.29 The 2005 Charter 
22. See N.Y.C. Charter § 311(b) (1989).
23. See id. § 328.
24. Council of New York. v. Bloomberg, 6 N.Y.3d 380, 388 (2006).
25. Id. at 388–89.
26. Comptroller of New York v. Mayor of New York., 7 N.Y.3d 256, 267 (2006).
27. Id. at 263–65.
28. Id. at 267.
29. 1989 Charter Revision Comm’n Report, supra note 13, at 19.
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Revision Commission, whose proposals were approved by the voters, continued these 
reforms by codifying in the Charter key state law reforms stemming from the city’s 
fiscal crisis of the 1970s, such as mandating the preparation of both a balanced budget 
that complies with generally accepted accounting principles and a four-year financial 
plan, and further restricting the city’s ability to issue short-term debt.30
 Today, the city spends money in accordance with a transparent appropriations 
process involving both the Mayor and the Council, who have combined in every year 
of the Bloomberg administration to produce budgets that are balanced and generally 
on time. In other words, as a result of the reforms put in place by the 1989 Commission 
and subsequent Charter Revision Commissions, the city is generally living within its 
means and regularly engaging in a discussion over how to continue to do so as fiscal 
conditions and the city’s needs evolve. Contrast this ongoing collaborative effort with 
the political brinksmanship at the federal level during the fiscal cliff debate, or even 
the budgetary woes of our city’s own checkered past, and we can appreciate how rare 
and valuable this budgetary reform has been.
 D. Government Integrity
 Another essential element in determining whether the Charter works is the 
integrity of the people who make up the government. In this area, the 1989 Charter, 
which includes the changes proposed by the 1988 Commission, marked a watershed 
moment in government ethics and elections, elevating the prominence of these issues 
and setting an example for the entire country. First, the 1988 Commission replaced 
the former Board of Ethics with the Conf licts of Interest Board (COIB),31 an 
independent city agency charged with enforcing the Conflicts of Interest Law32 that 
all city employees—including the Mayor and all elected and appointed officials—
must follow. Substantial penalties result if the COIB, composed of appointees of the 
Mayor with the advice and consent of the Council, finds that any government official 
has violated these conflicts laws. The importance of the COIB is illustrated by the 
recent case of Rosenblum v. New York City Conflicts of Interest Board, litigated by the 
Law Department, in which the New York Court of Appeals, reversing the Appellate 
Division, First Department, made clear that the reach of the city’s Conflicts of 
Interest Law extends not only to traditional city agency employees, but also to the 
thousands of pedagogical employees at the New York City Department of 
Education.33
 Second, the revisions of the 1988 Commission also ratified the earlier creation 
of, and provided Charter status to, the Campaign Finance Board (CFB), an 
independent, nonpartisan city agency whose mission is to increase voter participation 
30. See 2005 Ballot Questions, N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.nyc.gov/
html/charter/downloads/pdf/crc_ballot_questions.pdf.
31. See N.Y.C. Charter § 2602 (1988).
32. See N.Y.C. Charter § 2604 (2013).
33. See Rosenblum v. N.Y.C. Conflicts of Interest Bd., 18 N.Y.3d 422, 432 (2012).
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and reduce the influence of big money in politics.34 The CFB, whose members are 
appointed by the Mayor and the Council, publishes and disseminates multilingual 
information on candidates and issues in the New York City Voter Guide, and 
provides public matching funds for candidates who agree to abide by spending limits 
and disclose the sources of their contributions.35 The 1989 Charter thus established 
an active role for municipal government in promoting greater political participation, 
and paved the way for subsequent Charter Revision Commissions to strengthen the 
city’s campaign finance regulations and, outside of the Charter, for Administrative 
Code provisions limiting “pay to play,” or campaign contributions by persons engaged 
in business with the city.36
 The importance of the CFB’s independence, enforcement powers, and 
administration of public matching funds cannot be overstated, particularly in 2013—a 
time when the nation is struggling with the aftermath of the unfortunate Citizens 
United Supreme Court decision,37 a case that has generated significant litigation being 
handled by the Law Department, challenging the constitutionality of various CFB 
provisions. Getting things done in government requires both willing participants and 
a workable structure. The COIB and CFB reforms, which were further strengthened 
by the 2010 Charter Revision Commission,38 promote the integrity of that structure 
and public confidence in those who participate in it.
iii. thE fUtUrE Of ChartEr rEfOrM
 Since 1989, several Charter Revision Commissions appointed by Mayor 
Bloomberg, and earlier Charter Revision Commissions appointed by Mayor Giuliani, 
have refined the Charter in a few key areas, including the budget, elections, the 
creation and abolition of certain city agencies, and the structure and processes of 
administrative tribunals.
 But some of the larger questions raised by the 1989 Commission remain. The 
1989 Commission, unsure of the untested, newly empowered, unicameral legislature 
in the form of the City Council, envisioned using other citywide officers, like the 
Public Advocate and Borough Presidents, as additional checks on the Mayor.39 The 
Public Advocate, a position that evolved from the citywide elected City Council 
President, was conceived as a “watchdog” when it came to the delivery of the city’s 
34. See N.Y.C. Charter § 1052 (1988).
35. N.Y.C. Charter §§ 1052, 1053 (2013); see also About Us, N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., http://www.
nyccfb.info/about/ (last visited June 24, 2013).
36. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 3-703; see also Doing Business Accountability Project (“Pay to Play” Reform), 
N.Y.C. Mayor’s Office of Contract Servs., http://www.nyc.gov/html/mocs/html/programs/local_
law_34.shtml (last visited June 24, 2013).
37. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
38. See N.Y.C. Charter Revision Comm’n, Final Report of the 2010 New York City Charter 
Revision Commission 23, 32 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 Charter Revision Comm’n Report].
39. Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 816.
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services.40 Although eliminating the Board of Estimate substantially reduced the 
powers of the Borough Presidents,41 they were seen as an important intermediary 
between those representing the city as a whole, such as the Mayor, and those 
representing the most local units, such as the Council Members and community 
boards.42
 But the Council has in fact emerged as a strong and capable counterweight to, and 
at other times as a partner of, the Mayor. At the same time, the usefulness of the roles 
under the Charter of the Public Advocate and Borough Presidents has been questioned. 
In fact, the 2010 Charter Revision Commission heard testimony, including from the 
Public Advocate and Borough Presidents themselves, about the limited nature of their 
positions, as well as disagreement over how to define their roles with more precision.43 
Now may be a good time to revisit the question of whether those positions should be 
continued, and, if so, how their powers should be redefined.44
 Another area deserving of potential Charter amendment concerns an issue that 
emerged after the 1989 Commission had completed its work: the lack of city oversight 
over community benefit agreements (CBAs). CBAs are private agreements that are 
usually negotiated between developers and community groups in connection with a 
community development project, although sometimes the city or a particular elected 
official or community board does get involved. These agreements have become an 
increasingly common feature of the land use decisionmaking process, whether 
formally or informally, as we have seen with the new Yankee Stadium and Columbia 
University’s expansion into Manhattanville. Future Charter Revision Commissions 
may want to consider whether there is a role for the Charter to regulate CBAs. This 
could mean incorporating them into existing formal processes such as the ULURP, 
regulating their subject matter, limiting the participation of city officials in their 
public capacities, or something else entirely.45
iV. COnCLUsiOn
 As we reflect upon the 1989 Charter, it is my judgment that the Charter has, for 
the most part, served our city well. But, as with any document of this type, experience 
and the inevitable changes in our society can suggest ways in which it should be 
changed in the future.
40. Id. at 818, 821; see also Lucas Anderson, Promoting an Effective and Responsive City Government by 
Returning and Strengthening the Office of the Public Advocate, 58 N.Y.L Sch. L. Rev. 165 (2013–2014).
41. See Gregory Perrotta, A Case For and Against the Borough President in Twenty-First Century City Politics, 
58 N.Y.L Sch. L. Rev. 193 (2013–2014).
42. See Schwarz & Lane, supra note 4, at 811.
43. 2010 Charter Revision Comm’n Report, supra note 38, at 80–81, 87–88 (2010).
44. See Perrotta, supra note 41, at 207–12. 
45. See 2010 Charter Revision Comm’n Report, supra note 38, at 103–05 (2010).
